Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by
federal court of appeals opinions between March 1, 2010 and September
17, 2010. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then
by subject matter.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.
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CIVIL MATTERS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) – Notice and Comment: United
States v. Magnesium Corp. of Am., 616 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2010)
The 10th Circuit considered whether an agency may alter “its
original interpretation of [a] regulation without following the [notice and
comment] procedural requirements of the [APA][.]” Id. at 1136 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The 10th Circuit noted that defendants relied
on the D.C. Circuit’s holding that “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation
an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would
formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice and
comment rulemaking.” Id. at 1138 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The 3rd, 5th, and 6th Circuits have adopted the D.C. Circuit’s view and
the 1st and 9th Circuits have taken the contrary position. Id. at 1139. The
3rd Circuit has held that when “an agency’s present interpretation of a
regulation is a fundamental modification of a previous interpretation, the
modification can only be made in accordance with the notice and
comment requirements of the APA.” Id. at 1139 n.9. The 5th and 6th
Circuits agreed that “once an agency gives a regulation an interpretation,
[the APA requires] notice and comment . . . before the interpretation of
that regulation can be changed.” Id. The 1st and 9th Circuits have stated,
however, that “[n]o notice and comment rulemaking is required to amend
a previous interpretive rule.” Id. The 10th Circuit found guidance in the
language of 5 U.S.C. § 553, “which makes perfectly clear that notice and
comment procedures required for substantive (or legislative) rules . . .
[do not] apply to ‘interpretive rules[,]’” and further stated that the
common holding of the 3rd, 5th and 6th Circuits “flouts the APA’s clear
distinction between interpretive and substantive rules.” Id. at 1139, 1140.
The 10th Circuit therefore joined the 1st and 9th Circuits, holding that an
interpretive rule need not “undergo notice and comment before taking
effect.” Id. at 1140.
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BANKRUPTCY
Practice and Proceedings – Conversion and Dismissal: Jacobsen v.
Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2010)
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a debtor’s right to dismiss
under [11 U.S.C.] § 1307(b) [is] absolute or [is] qualified by an
exception for bad faith or abuse of process.” Id. at 653. The court noted
that the 9th Circuit initially determined that “the right to dismiss was
absolute,” and the 2nd Circuit agreed, “no such exception existed.” Id. at
653, 655. By contrast, the 8th Circuit found that § 1307(b) is “subject to
an exception where a Chapter 13 debtor acts in bad faith or abuses the
bankruptcy process.” Id. at 654. In a later decision, however, the 9th
Circuit reasoned that a Supreme Court holding on a similar provision
“supported an exception to § 1307(b) . . . .” Id. at 669. The 5th Circuit
ultimately agreed with both the 8th and 9th Circuits, rejecting the
debtor’s absolute right to dismiss under §1307(b) and limiting that right
to a finding of bad faith. Id. at 660. The court disagreed with the 2nd
Circuit’s finding that the debtor’s right to dismiss under §1307(b) is
absolute and unqualified, characterizing this holding as an “escape
hatch” for abusive debtors. Id. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that a
debtor’s right to dismiss under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) is not absolute and is
limited to a finding of bad faith. Id.
Purchase Money Security Interest – Negative Equity: AmeriCredit
Fin. Servs. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit created a circuit split in addressing “whether a
creditor has a purchase money security interest in the ‘negative equity’ of
a vehicle traded in at the time of a new vehicle purchase.” Id. at 1159.
The court declined to adopt the reasoning of the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th,
8th, 10th, and 11th Circuits, all holding that “a creditor has a purchase
money security interest in the negative equity of a debtor’s trade-in
vehicle.” Id. at 1160. Considering whether the negative equity in a tradein vehicle constituted a “price,” the 9th Circuit first explained that the
payment of remaining debt on a prior vehicle cannot qualify as an
“expense” because “[i]t is the payment of an antecedent debt, not an
expense incurred in buying the new vehicle.” Id. at 1162. The court
further reasoned that the negative equity of the trade-in vehicle is not
“closely connected” enough to the purchase of the new vehicle to meet
the requirements of U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3, even though the transactions
often occur simultaneously. Id. Finally, the court found that “negative
equity cannot fall under the ‘other similar obligations’ category because
negative equity is unlike the examples listed in Comment 3.” Id. The 9th
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Circuit held “a creditor does not have a purchase money security interest
in the ‘negative equity’ of a vehicle traded in during a new vehicle
purchase.” Id. at 1164.
Selling Causes of Action – Judicial Approval of Settlement in a
Bankruptcy Proceeding: Cadle Co. v. Mims (In re Moore), 608 F.3d
253 (5th Cir. 2010)
The 5th Circuit ruled on two issues that currently split the courts of
appeals. First, the 5th Circuit addressed “[w]hether [a creditor’s] overbid
require[s] the bankruptcy court to scrutinize the proposed compromise
under § 363 and rule 6004, in addition to rule 9019(a) [of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure],” in other words, “whether the
settlement of a claim that the estate owns is a sale (that is, disposition) of
property of the estate.” Id. 263–64. On this issue, the court noted that the
1st Circuit has held that the settlement of a claim is not a sale, while the
3rd, 6th, 7th Circuits and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 9th
Circuit have held that “settlement of a cause of action held by the estate
is plainly the equivalent of a sale of that claim.” Id. at 264 (citations
omitted). The 5th Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit’s holding that “[t]he
proposed settlement was a disposition of estate assets.” Id. at 266. Next,
the 5th Circuit addressed “whether the trustee may sell causes of action
that arise from his avoidance powers.” Id. at 261. The court noted that
the 9th Circuit “permits such actions to be sold or transferred” while the
3rd Circuit does not. Id. at 261 n.13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The 5th Circuit reasoned “[t]he right to re coup a fraudulent conveyance,
which outside of bankruptcy may be invoked by a creditor, is property of
the estate that only a trustee or debtor in possession may pursue once a
bankruptcy is under way” and such claims become part of the estate once
bankruptcy is underway by virtue of trustee successor rights. Id. at 261
(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the 5th Circuit agreed with
the 7th and 9th Circuits, holding that a “trustee may . . . sell . . . state law
fraudulent conveyance actions back to [the appellant].” Id.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Class Action – Opting In, Post Class Certification: Bright v. United
States, 603 F.3d 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
The Federal Circuit addressed whether putative class members may
opt into litigation under U.S. Court of Federal Claims Rule 23 after the
expiration of the limitations period when a class action complaint was
within the six-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2501 and “class
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certification was sought prior to expiration of the limitations period, but
the complaint was not amended to add other named plaintiffs as putative
class members until after expiration of the limitations period.” Id. at
1281. The court noted that the “[3rd] Circuit applied tolling to opt-in
class actions” while the 11th Circuit “reasoned that tolling should not
apply to plaintiffs in civil class actions.” Id. at 1285. The Federal Circuit
agreed with the 3rd Circuit, finding that maintaining the availability of
the opt-in scheme for class action “is most consistent with the objectives
which class action procedures are meant to achieve.” Id. The court
disagreed with the 11th Circuit’s reasoning that a plaintiff does not
commence a class action when the complaint is filed, but rather when the
“putative plaintiff files a written consent to opt into the class action.” Id.
Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that U.S. Court of Federal Claims
Rule 23 permits putative class members to opt into litigation “when class
certification is sought prior to expiration of the period, but the complaint
is not amended to add other named plaintiffs as putative class members
until after the expiration period.” Id. at 1290.
Court Fees – Sequential or Cumulative Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915:
Christensen v. Big Horn County Bd. Of County Comm’rs, 374 Fed.
App’x 821 (10th Cir. 2010)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether 28 U.S.C. § 1915 allows filing
fees for multiple appeals to be deducted from a prisoner’s account
sequentially rather than cumulatively. Id. at 829. The court noted that the
5th, 7th and 8th Circuits determined that the fees for multiple cases
should be deducted in total, while the 2nd Circuit found that they should
be sequential. Id. at 830. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 5th, 7th and
8th Circuits in finding that “the overarching purpose of the statute, to
restrain runaway prison litigation with some pay-as-you-go constraint,
would be diluted if not defeated by permitting prisoners with one
ongoing case to postpone all successive filing fee obligations.” Id. The
court disagreed with the 2nd Circuit’s position on sequential or per
prisoner payment, which the 2nd Circuit espoused “to avoid potential
constitutional concerns over the burden simultaneous collection of
multiple fee obligations could place on a prisoner’s right of access to the
courts.” Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded, “§ 1952(b)(2) authorizes
cumulative deductions of twenty percent for each civil action or appellate
filing fee incurred by a prisoner.” Id. at 833.
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District Court Discretion – Federal Magistrate Act: Glidden Co. v.
Kinsella, 386 Fed. App’x 535 (6th Cir. 2010)
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether a party may raise new
arguments before a district judge that were not presented to the
magistrate judge.” Id. at 544 n.2. The court noted that the 1st, 5th, 8th,
and 10th Circuits determined that a party waives arguments if it does not
raise them before a magistrate judge, while the 4th Circuit found that
district courts must address all arguments regardless of whether parties
raised them before the magistrate judge. Id. The 6th Circuit also noted
that the 9th and 11th Circuits held that district courts have discretion not
to consider an argument if a party did not present it to the magistrate
judge. Id. The 6th Circuit joined the 1st, 5th, 8th, and 10th Circuits in
holding that a party waives an argument if it does not raise it before a
magistrate judge. Id.
Fraud Class Action – Presumption of Reliance: Malack v. BDO
Seidman, LLP, 617 F.3d 743 (3d Cir. 2010)
The 3rd Circuit considered whether a “fraud-created-the-market”
theory may establish a presumption of reliance as required by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b), which will satisfy the predominance
requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Id. at 744–45.
The 3rd Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has “held that a
presumption of reliance exists in two circumstances”: failure to disclose
material facts, and fraud-on-the-market. Id. at 747. The 5th and 7th
Circuits have also included a third theory, fraud-created-the-market,
which establishes a presumption of reliance when a plaintiff “prove[s]
that the defendants conspired to bring to market securities that were not
entitled to be marketed.” Id. at 747–48 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The 3rd Circuit noted that “considerations of fairness, public
policy, and probability, as well as judicial economy, often underlie the
creation of presumptions[.]” Id. at 749 (internal quotation marks
omitted). It also observed that courts use presumptions to manage
circumstances in which direct proof is difficult to acquire. Id. The 3rd
Circuit further commented that the notion of probability is “the most
important consideration in the creation of presumptions” because “[m]ost
presumptions have come into existence primarily because judges have
believed that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact
A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of
fact A until the adversary disproves it.” Id. The 3rd Circuit found that
these considerations “counsel for rejection of the fraud-created-themarket theory[,]” reasoning that the new theory would encourage
frivolous litigation that would ultimately cause harm. Id. at 749, 755. The
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3rd Circuit therefore joined the 7th Circuit in rejecting “fraud-createdthe-market” as a plausible theory for establishing a presumption of
reliance to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. Id. at 745.
Preliminary Injunctions – Judicial Test: Alliance for the Wild Rockies
v. Cottrell, 613 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether it was valid to continue using the
“sliding scale” approach to preliminary injunctions. Id. at 965. The court
noted that the 4th Circuit determined that the “sliding scale approach is
now invalid,” while the 2nd and 7th Circuits found the approach valid.
Id. at 966. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 2nd and 7th Circuits, finding
the sliding scale approach allows courts to apply a flexible, case-by-case
analysis of whether to grant a preliminary injunction. Id. at 966–68.
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that the sliding scale approach continues
to be a valid approach to the issue of preliminary injunctions. Id. at 968.
ESTATE LAW
Restitution Order – Abatement ab initio Doctrine: United States v.
Rich, 603 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit addressed “[w]hether a restitution order abates.” Id.
at 728. The court noted that the 3rd, 4th, and 6th Circuits held that
restitution orders are not abated, while the 5th and 11th Circuits hold that
restitution orders are abated. Id. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 5th and
11th Circuits, finding that the statute imposing restitution “require[d] that
the defendant first must be ‘convicted of an offense’ . . . to support an
order of restitution[,]” and “[a]batement of the convictions for those
offenses . . . nullifies the accompanying restitution order.” Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that “[t]he common law doctrine of
abatement ab initio confirms our interpretation of the statute.” Id. at 729.
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded that “[t]he Restitution Order must be
abated.” Id.
IMMIGRATION
Jurisdiction – Review of Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
Decision: Lopez-Dubon v. Holder, 609 F.3d 642 (5th Cir. 2010)
The 5th Circuit addressed the question of whether an issue not
properly raised by a petitioner in immigration proceedings, but
nevertheless addressed on the merits by the BIA, may be considered by a
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federal court of appeals. Id. at 644. The court noted that almost every
court of appeals will address an issue on the merits when the BIA has
done so, even if the petitioner did not properly present the issue to the
BIA. Id. The court observed that only the 11th Circuit bars review when
a petitioner has not properly raised the issue in immigration proceedings.
Id. at 645 n.1. The 5th Circuit agreed with the majority of circuits,
finding “the purpose of the statutory exhaustion requirement is to allow
the Board of Immigration Appeals the opportunity to apply its
specialized knowledge and experience to the matter and to resolve a
controversy or correct its own errors before judicial intervention.” Id. at
644. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that “[i]f the BIA deems an issue
sufficiently presented to consider it on the merits, such action by the BIA
exhausts the issue as far as the agency is concerned and that is all that [is
statutorily] require[ed] to confer [court of appeals] jurisdiction.” Id.
Removability – Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA): Claudio v.
Holder, 601 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2010)
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether a petitioner exhausts his claims
by raising all of them in a notice of appeal to the [BIA], but addressing
only some in a supporting brief.” Id. at 318. The court noted that the 3rd
Circuit has held “that exhaustion of an issue does not require an appellant
before the BIA, who has clearly identified an issue in his notice of
appeal, to reiterate and to address that same issue in an optional brief.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Conversely, the 9th Circuit stated
that “when a petitioner files a brief, he will be deemed to have exhausted
only those issues he raised and argued in his brief before the BIA.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, the 6th Circuit noted that
“all issues not raised in an appellant’s brief[] [are waived], even if the
issue has been raised in the notice of appeal.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). The 5th Circuit agreed with the 6th and 9th Circuits’
reasoning, finding that “once a petitioner elects in his notice of appeal to
file a brief, that brief becomes the operative document through which any
issues that a petitioner wishes to have considered must be raised.” Id. at
319. Thus, the 5th Circuit held that a petitioner does not exhaust his
claims “when [he] indicates on his notice of appeal that he will file a
brief and then fails to do so . . . .” Id. at 318.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Infringement – Copyright Act: Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/InteractiveCorp, 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit addressed the issue of whether “a copyright [is]
registered at the time the copyright holder’s application is received by
the Copyright Office (the ‘application approach’), or at the time that the
Office acts on the application and issues a certificate of registration (the
‘registration approach’)[.]” Id. at 615. The court noted that the 5th and
7th Circuits have adopted the application approach while the 10th and
11th Circuits have adopted the registration approach. Id. at 616. The 9th
Circuit agreed with the 5th and 7th Circuits and adopted the application
approach. Id. at 619. First, the court noted that the ambiguity of the
Copyright Act made it “necessary to go beyond the Act’s plain language
to determine which approach better carries out the purpose of the
statute.” Id. at 618. The court then found that “the application approach
better fulfills Congress’s purpose of providing broad copyright protection
while maintaining a robust federal register.” Id. at 619. Therefore, the 9th
Circuit concluded “that receipt by the Copyright Office of a complete
application satisfies the registration requirement of § 411(a).” Id. at 621.
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) –
Retaliation: Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, 610 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir.
2010)
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether the anti-retaliation provision of
[§] 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, protects an employee’s unsolicited
internal complaints to management.” Id. at 218. The court noted that the
5th and 9th Circuits have determined that the statute’s anti-retaliation
provision protects an employee’s unsolicited internal complaints to
management, while the 2nd and 4th Circuits have held that it does not.
Id. The 3rd Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the 5th and 9th
Circuits that excluding internal complaints from § 510’s protection
would “inhibit the effectiveness of the anti-retaliation provision[,]”
noting that neither circuit closely examined the statutory language in
arriving at either decision. Id. at 221, 223. Instead, the 3rd Circuit agreed
with the 2nd and 4th Circuits and concluded that a narrow reading of the
plain language of § 510’s anti-retaliation provision was appropriate. Id.
at 221–22. Thus, the 3rd Circuit held that the anti-retaliation provision of
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§ 510 of ERISA does not protect an employee’s unsolicited internal
complaints to management. Id. at 218.
Workers Compensation – Injury on Job: Valladolid v. Pac.
Operations Offshore, LLP, 604 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether “an employee must be injured on
the outer continental shelf to be eligible for workers’ compensation
benefits under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA)[.]” Id. at
1129. The court noted that the 3rd Circuit has “rejected the situs-ofinjury test and held that a claimant need only satisfy a ‘but for’ test in
establishing that the injury occurred as the result of operations on the
outer continental shelf.” Id. at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Conversely, the 5th Circuit has adopted the situs-of-injury test and has
required a claimant to “show that the injury occurred on an outer
continental shelf platform or on the waters above the outer continental
shelf, in addition to satisfying the ‘but for’ test.” Id. at 1130–31. The
court disagreed with the 5th Circuit because the “results of an operation
may regularly extend beyond its immediate physical location.” Id. at
1134. Further, the court disagreed with the 3rd Circuit, and noted that
Congress could not have intended to promulgate the simple “but for”
test. Id. at 1139. Thus, the 9th Circuit adopted a new test and concluded
that “the claimant must establish a substantial nexus between the injury
and extractive operations on the shelf[,]” and “[t]o meet the standard, the
claimant must show that the work performed directly furthers outer
continental shelf operations and is in the regular course of such
operations.” Id.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) – Services, Programs, or
Activities: Frame v. City of Arlington, 616 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2010)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether sidewalks, curbs and parking
lots are deemed “services, programs, or activities” under Title II of the
ADA. Id. at 484–85. The 2nd, 3rd, 6th and 9th Circuits each interpreted
the phrase “services, programs, or activities broadly . . . allow[ing]
private claims to force cities to update their systems of pedestrian
walkways in compliance with Department of Justice regulations.” Id. at
485 n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 9th Circuit concluded
that Title II includes sidewalks because they are “normal function[s] of a
government entity.” Id. Similarly, the 3rd and 6th Circuits have held that
“the phrase ‘services, programs, or activities’ encompasses virtually
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everything that a public entity does.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The 2nd Circuit “called the language a catch-all phrase that
prohibits all discrimination by a public entity, regardless of context,”
counseling against “hair-splitting arguments over what falls within its
reach.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Disagreeing with these
circuits, the 5th Circuit first noted that “the statute’s ‘qualified individual
with a disability’ definition suggests a distinction between certain
physical infrastructure on the one hand and services, programs, and
activities on the other.” Id. at 486. The 5th Circuit acknowledged that
“services” could nevertheless be broadly construed to include at least
some infrastructure, thereby finding that the statutory language is
ambiguous. Id. An examination of the regulations promulgated by the
Department of Justice revealed that sidewalks, curbs and parking lots are
facilities that must necessarily be distinct from services, programs, or
activities, in order to avoid superfluous statutory language and meaning.
Id. at 487–88. Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded that “sidewalks, curbs, and
parking lots” are not “services, programs, or activities” under Title II. Id.
Declaratory Relief – Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): City of Colton v. Am.
Promotional Events, Inc. - West, 614 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit addressed “[w]hether a CERCLA plaintiff’s failure
to establish liability for its past costs necessarily dooms its bid to obtain a
declaratory judgment as to liability for its future costs.” Id. at 1006. The
court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, and 8th Circuits determined that
“recoverable past costs are a sine qua non for declaratory relief under
CERCLA[,]” while the 1st and 10th Circuits “suggested that declaratory
relief may be available even in the absence of recoverable past costs.” Id.
at 1006–07. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 3rd, and 8th Circuits,
viewing the plain language of the statute as indicating that Congress did
not intend “for a declaration of future liability to be available . . . .” Id. at
1007–08. The court also found persuasive the argument that “[p]roviding
declaratory relief based on mere assurances of future compliance with
the [national contingency plan] would create little incentive for parties to
ensure that their initial cleanup efforts are on the right track.” Id. at 1008.
Thus, the 9th Circuit concluded, when “the plaintiff fails to establish . . .
liability in its initial cost-recovery action, no declaratory relief is
available as a matter of law.” Id.
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Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) – Compensatory Damages:
Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 617 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 2010)
The 3rd Circuit considered whether “a degree of specificity which
may include corroborating testimony or medical or psychological
evidence . . .” is necessary to support a compensatory damage award. Id.
at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 3rd Circuit acknowledged
that the 2nd and 5th Circuits had rejected evidence similar to that offered
in this case as “insufficient to support compensatory damage awards[]”
to support claims that negligent violations of the FCRA caused
humiliation, embarrassment or mental distress, effectively creating a
higher standard of proof. Id. at 719–20. The court stated that
“corroboration goes only to the weight of evidence of injury, not the
existence of it.” Id. at 720. The court noted that humiliation,
embarrassment and mental distress are “precisely the kind[s] of injur[ies]
that Congress must have known would result from violations of the
FCRA.” Id. The court reasoned that “[i]f a jury accepts testimony of a
plaintiff that establishes an injury . . . the plaintiff should be allowed to
recover . . . . The fact that the plaintiff’s injuries relate to stress and
anxiety caused by the defendant’s conduct does not change that.” Id. The
3rd Circuit therefore refused to adopt the 5th Circuit’s view, which
required “a degree of specificity which may include corroborating
testimony or medical or psychological evidence in support of [a
compensatory] damage award.” Id.
State and Territorial Governments – Sovereign Immunity: Iowa
Tribe v. Salazar, 607 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2010)
The 10th Circuit addressed the proper construction of a federal
waiver of sovereign immunity. Id. at 1236–37. The court noted that the
2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits “applied a time of filing rule to assess the
United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 2410,”
while the 1st Circuit took the view that it should construe waivers of
sovereign immunity narrowly based on congressional intent. Id. The 10th
Circuit agreed with the 1st Circuit in finding that federal waivers of
sovereign immunity should be construed narrowly in order to provide
proper deference to congressional intent. Id. at 1237. The court disagreed
with the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits’ determination that sovereign
immunity should be “based on the existence of a waiver at the time of
filing.” Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that “sovereign immunity is
an ongoing inquiry rather than a determination to be made based on the
existence of a waiver at the time of filing.” Id.

2010]

Current Circuit Splits

117

CRIMINAL MATTERS
CRIMINAL LAW
Child Pornography – 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a): United States v. Humphrey,
608 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2010)
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of whether “scienter with
respect to the victim’s age is an element of the offense under [18 U.S.C.]
§ 2251(a), and whether a mistake of age defense is available under the
statute . . . .” Id. at 958. The court noted that the 9th Circuit stands alone
in finding that “§ 2251(a) does not contain a scienter requirement” but
that “the First Amendment requires a reasonable mistake-of-age defense”
under the same statute. Id. at 958–59. Conversely, the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 7th,
and 8th Circuits have rejected the view of the 9th Circuit, holding that “a
defendant’s knowledge of the minor’s age is not an element of the
offense[]” and rejecting “the notion espoused [by the 9th Circuit] of a
constitutionally mandated mistake-of-age defense.” Id. at 960. The 6th
Circuit also rejected the 9th Circuit and instead followed the majority
approach. Id. at 962. Therefore, the 6th Circuit concluded that “the
statutory text, legislative history, and judicial interpretation compel the
conclusion that knowledge of the victim’s age is neither an element of
the offense nor textually available as an affirmative defense[]” and that
“First Amendment concerns, when balanced against the ‘surpassing
importance of the government’s interest in safeguarding the physical and
psychological wellbeing of children’ do not oblige us to engraft a
reasonable mistake-of-age defense onto § 2251(a).” Id.
Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses – Application in the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA): United States
v. Utesch, 596 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2010)
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “SORNA by its own terms
applies to sex offenders who were convicted prior to SORNA’s
enactment.” Id. at 307. The 6th Circuit noted that the 8th and 10th
Circuits have determined that SORNA applies retroactively, and §
16913(d) of SORNA only gives the Attorney General limited power to
prescribe the procedure for convicted offenders to follow. Id. In contrast,
the 6th Circuit observed that the 4th, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 11th Circuits
found that “[SORNA] itself only applies going forward until the
Attorney General prescribes otherwise.” Id. The 6th Circuit
acknowledged that it had previously issued a panel decision holding “that
SORNA was not retroactive as of the date of its enactment and that §
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16913(d) vested the retroactivity decision with the Attorney General.” Id.
at 308. The panel decision considered the applicability of an interim rule
promulgated by the Attorney General, and it held that the “rule did not
apply SORNA to the defendant . . . where the defendant was indicted . . .
prior to the comments deadline . . . and less than thirty days after
publication.” Id. at 310. In the instant case, the 6th Circuit extended the
panel decision and held that the interim rule could not apply SORNA
retroactively to “an indictment charging a defendant after the close of the
comment period and more than thirty days after publication of the rule.”
Id. The 6th Circuit reasoned that the Attorney General “solicited
comments, but the interim rule became effective immediately, before
receipt and review of any public feedback”; therefore, “the interim rule
did not make SORNA effective against [defendant] or any other
defendants convicted before SORNA’s enactment.” Id.
Filing Fee Collection – Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Torres
v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010)
The 4th Circuit addressed “whether [28 U.S.C.] § 1915(b)(2) allows
only a maximum of twenty percent to be taken from a prisoner’s monthly
income regardless of the number of cases or appeals filed, or [whether]
the statute require[s] (or permit[s]) twenty percent be taken each month
for each case or appeal that the prisoner files . . . .” Id. at 241–42. The
court noted that the 5th, 7th, and 8th Circuits determined that §
1915(b)(2) requires prisoners to pay “twenty percent of their funds
towards filing fees per case and per appeal[,]” while the 2nd Circuit
found that § 1915(b)(2) “cap[s] the payment of fees at twenty percent of
the prisoner’s income, regardless of the number of cases or appeals for
which the prisoner is indebted.” Id. at 242. The 4th Circuit agreed with
the 2nd Circuit, finding that Congress’s intent, according to the
legislative history and structure of the statute, was to limit the collection
of all court fees to twenty percent of an inmate’s income. Id. at 245–46.
The 4th Circuit also agreed with the 2nd Circuit that the alternative “per
case” interpretation would raise a constitutional question of equal access
in cases where an inmate’s entire income was subject to garnishment for
filing fees. Id. at 245. The court disagreed with the 5th, 7th, and 8th
Circuits in their holding that “per inmate” interpretation would open a
“floodgate” of prison litigation. Id. at 246. Thus, the 4th Circuit
concluded that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2), the court may garnish an
inmate’s income up to twenty percent for the payment of court filing fees
regardless of how many cases or appeals an inmate has filed. Id. at 252.
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Retroactive Application – Good Cause Promulgation and the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA): United States
v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2010)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the Attorney General’s public
safety justification qualified as good cause to “promulgate a rule making
[SORNA] retroactive without notice and comment as required by the
Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at 1276. The court noted that two
other circuits had previously addressed this issue. Id. at 1279. The 4th
Circuit held that “[t]here was a need for legal certainty about SORNA’s
‘retroactive’ application to sex offenders convicted before SORNA and a
concern for public safety that these offenders be registered in accordance
with SORNA as quickly as possible.” Id. Further, the 4th Circuit
maintained that “[d]elaying implementation of the regulation to
accommodate notice and comment could reasonably be found to put the
public safety at greater risk.” Id. In contrast, the 6th Circuit found that
the Attorney General did not have cause to bypass those requirements in
a case with similar facts. Id. at 1280. The 11th Circuit agreed with the
4th Circuit, finding that concerns over public safety justified the
Attorney General’s actions. Id. at 1281. The 11th Circuit concluded that
“[r]etroactive application of the rule allowed the federal government to
immediately start prosecuting sex offenders who failed to register in state
registries . . . [and] reduced the risk of additional sexual assaults and
sexual abuse by sex offenders . . . .” Id.
Underlying Assault – 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1): United States v. Williams,
602 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2010)
The 5th Circuit addressed whether a defendant can “be convicted of
forcible resistance under [§ 111(a)(1)] without having committed an
underlying assault[.]” Id. at 316. The court noted that the 9th Circuit
found that convictions under the statute “require at least some form of
assault,” and that “without requiring some sort of underlying assault, it
would be impossible to distinguish non-assaultive misdemeanor
resistance cases from felonious resistance cases . . . .” Id. at 316–17.
Conversely, the 6th Circuit determined that interpreting the statute as
“requiring an underlying assault for a defendant to be convicted would
render meaningless the five forms of non-assaultive conduct that are
plainly proscribed by the statute.” Id. at 317. The 5th Circuit agreed with
the 6th Circuit that this interpretation promoted the dual purposes of the
statute, namely: “protect[ing] federal officers by punishing assault . . .”
and “deter[ring] interference with federal law enforcement activities . . .
by punishing obstruction and other forms of resistance.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, the 5th Circuit concluded, “a
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misdemeanor conviction under § 111(a)(1) does not require underlying
assaultive conduct.” Id. at 318.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Fourth Amendment Protection – Probable Cause: Aldini v. Johnson,
609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010)
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of “whether the Fourth
Amendment continues to provide protection against deliberate use of
excessive force beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial
detention begins[,]” and specifically whether it is the Fourth Amendment
or the Fourteenth Amendment that “protect[s] those arrested without a
warrant between the time of arrest and arraignment.” Id. at 864. The 6th
Circuit noted that the 2nd, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits have found
“that the Fourth Amendment applies until an individual arrested without
a warrant appears before a neutral magistrate for arraignment or for a
probable cause hearing, or until the arrestee leaves the joint or sole
custody of the arresting officer or officers.” Id. at 865 n.6. The court also
noted the 5th Circuit’s conclusion “that the relevant constitutional
provisions overlap and blur in certain factual contexts.” Id. In contrast,
the court noted that the 4th, 7th, and 11th Circuits have held that “after
the act of arrest, substantive due process is the proper constitutional
provision because the Fourth Amendment is no longer relevant.” Id. The
6th Circuit agreed with the 2nd, 6th, 8th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in finding
that the “reasonableness standard governs throughout the seizure of a
person . . . .” Id. at 865. The 6th Circuit disagreed with the 4th, 7th, and
11th Circuits’ findings that the plaintiff was not in a situation where his
rights were governed by either the Fourth or the Eighth Amendments. Id.
Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that where “the plaintiff was a free
person at the time of the incident, and the use of force occurred in the
course of an arrest or other seizure of the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s claim is
governed by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard[]” until
the time of the probable cause hearing, when his legal status changes to
make the plaintiff a pretrial detainee. Id. at 865–67.
Time Limitations – Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act:
Lee v. Lampert, 610 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2010)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether there is a “gateway” actual
innocence exception through the statute of limitations for original
Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act petitions. Id. at 1128. The
court noted that the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 8th Circuits determined that there is
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no such “gateway” actual innocence exception, while the 6th Circuit
found that this exception to the statute of limitations is valid. Id. The 9th
Circuit agreed with the 1st, 5th, 7th, and 8th Circuits in finding that “the
omission of ‘actual innocence’ from the enumerated list of exceptions in
the statutory text is significant . . . .” Id. at 1129. Thus, the 9th Circuit
concluded that the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act does not
permit a “gateway” actual innocence exception to the statute of
limitations. Id. at 1130–31.
SENTENCING
Enforcement of Plea Agreements – Reductions Based on Amended
Sentencing Ranges: United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 607 F.3d 283 (1st
Cir. 2010)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether “a defendant who [is] sentenced
pursuant to a binding C-type plea agreement . . .” is “entitled to a
sentence reduction by reason of retroactive amendments to the
sentencing guidelines designed to lower sentences for crack cocaine
offenses[.]” Id. at 284. The court noted that the 2nd, 3rd, and 6th Circuits
have determined that a district court, under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), lacks
authority to modify a sentence imposed pursuant to a C-type plea
agreement when the agreement was negotiated according to subsequently
amended sentencing guidelines. Id. at 285–86. The court also noted that
the 5th and 7th Circuits have approached the issue on a case-by-case
basis to determine “whether a particular sentence, when rendered, could
fairly be said to have been based on the guidelines.” Id. at 286. Finally,
the court noted that the 10th Circuit had held “a district court has
authority to reduce a sentence imposed pursuant to a C-type plea
agreement.” Id. The 1st Circuit disagreed with the 2nd and 6th Circuits
as to district courts’ power to modify sentences imposed pursuant to a
C-type plea agreement under § 3582. Id. at 288. Instead, the 1st Circuit
based its holding in contract theory and concluded that “in the absence of
explicit countervailing language in the plea agreement, 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) does not apply . . . ” and defendants who are sentenced
pursuant to C-type plea agreements are ineligible for sentence reductions.
Id. at 284.
Jurisdictional Variation – Fast-Track Reductions: United States v.
Camacho-Arellano, 614 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2010)
The 6th Circuit considered “whether to impose a lower sentence
[for defendant] based on the disparities created by the existence of ‘fast-
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track’ early-disposition programs for illegal-reentry cases in other
jurisdictions,” following the reasoning in Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85 (2007). Id. at 245. The circuits disagree over the effect of
“fast-track” reduction for defendants, a congressional policy in border
jurisdictions allowing for a downward departure from the Sentencing
Guidelines in exchange for a defendant’s agreement not to file pretrial
motions or contest issues. Id. at 247–48. Kimbrough allows district
courts to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines based on disagreement
with the Guidelines’ policies. Id. at 249. After Kimbrough, the 5th, 9th,
and 11th Circuits re-affirmed their fast-track precedents, interpreting
Kimbrough to allow variance only on disagreement with Guidelines’
policy, and not with congressional policy. Id. Conversely, the 1st and 3rd
Circuits read Kimbrough as allowing district courts to depart from the
Guidelines if the court finds such a departure is “not unwarranted.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). The 6th Circuit agreed with the 1st
and 3rd Circuits, noting that Congress did not prohibit district court
judges in non-fast-track jurisdictions from treating defendants as if they
were in a fast-track jurisdiction. Id. The 6th Circuit further rejected the
argument that Congress endorsed the disparities that would occur among
defendants in differing jurisdictions, and further, even if such disparity
was intended, “it has not endorsed the further disparity that is created by
charge bargaining . . .” among jurisdictions. Id. at 249–50. Thus, the 6th
Circuit held that “Kimbrough requires that [courts] repudiate any prior
hint that district judges could not grant variances based on the fast-track
disparity.” Id. at 250.
Sentencing Enhancements – Double Counting: United States v. Bell,
598 F.3d 366 (7th Cir. 2010)
The 7th Circuit addressed the issue of “applying a two-level
enhancement for violating a court order . . . .” Id. at 371. The court noted
that the 11th and 2nd Circuits determined that two-level enhancements
are permissible if they punish a defendant for separate, distinct harms. Id.
The court disagreed with the 11th and 2nd Circuits, noting that the 2nd
Circuit “may define double counting differently than [the 7th Circuit].”
Id. at 373. The 7th Circuit refused to embrace the “separate harms theory
of double counting,” and it focused instead “on the conduct that supports
the enhancements.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court
noted that “conduct that always inflicts multiple distinct harms may
validly receive a punishment enhanced on account of one of the harms.”
Id. Thus, the 7th Circuit held that applying “both the cross-reference . . .
and the enhancement for violation of a court or administrative order is
impermissible double counting.” Id.
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual – Discretion of the Courts in
Sentencing: United States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193 (4th Cir. 2010)
The 4th Circuit addressed the issue of whether applying the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i) (2008) contravenes
the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, which “prohibits
retroactive laws that create a ‘significant risk’ of increased punishment
for a crime.” Id. at 197–99. After a Supreme Court decision deeming the
Guidelines to be advisory, the circuits “disagreed on whether the Ex Post
Facto Clause prohibits a sentencing court from retroactively applying
severity-enhancing Guidelines amendments.” Id. at 199. The D.C.
Circuit held that retroactively applying the “severity-enhancing”
Guidelines contravenes the Ex Post Facto Clause, while the 7th Circuit
decided that the Ex Post Facto Clause allows the retroactive application
of the “severity-increasing” Guidelines. Id. The 4th Circuit agreed with
the D.C. Circuit because the D.C. Circuit’s decision better comports with
the precedent in the 4th Circuit and because it characterizes the
Guidelines as an “anchor” for a sentencing judge. Id. at 200–02. The 4th
Circuit disagreed with the 7th Circuit’s reasoning that the “Ex Post Facto
Clause ‘should apply only to laws and regulations that bind rather than
advise’ . . .[and that] sentencing judges . . . have ‘unfettered’ discretion
to sentence outside of the Guidelines range . . . .” Id. at 202. The 4th
Circuit also disagreed with the 7th Circuit because: (1) “the question is
not whether the sentencing courts retain discretion under the
Guidelines . . . [rather,] the proper approach is to assess how the
sentencing courts exercise their ‘discretion in practice,’ and whether that
exercise of discretion creates a ‘significant risk’ of prolonged
punishment,” and (2) in the 7th Circuit, sentencing outside of the
Guidelines range is subject “only to a ‘light appellate review,’” whereas,
in the 4th Circuit, “failure to properly calculate the advisory sentencing
range is a significant procedural error that requires [the court] to vacate
the ultimate sentence.” Id. at 203. Thus, the 4th Circuit concluded that
applying the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)
contravened the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. Id.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual – Sentence Reduction: United
States v. Flemming, 617 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2010)
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether a career offender who receives
a U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3 downward departure
under a pre-2003 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines to the Guidelines
range for crack cocaine offenses is eligible for a sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 254. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, and 4th
Circuits determined that a defendant qualifies for a reduced sentence,
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while the 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits have held that a defendant does not.
Id. The 3rd Circuit agreed with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Circuits in finding
that the defendant’s first sentence must have been based on a range that
has since been lowered and that the reduction must follow sentencing
policy statements in order to qualify for further sentence reduction. Id. at
257. The court disagreed with the 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits findings that
prior “downward departure has no effect on a defendant’s applicable
guideline range.” Id. at 266. Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that “a
career offender who is granted downward departure to the Crack Cocaine
Guidelines range is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).”
Id. at 272.
Supervised Release – Fugitive Status: United States v. HernandezFerrer, 599 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2010)
The 1st Circuit addressed whether a term of supervised release is
tolled under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) “during any period in which an
offender has absconded from supervision[,]” or, more simply, whether an
offender’s “fugitive status tolls the running of a term of supervised
release.” Id. at 67. The court noted that the 9th Circuit has agreed with
the government’s position that “an offender’s fugitive status tolls the
running of a supervised release.” Id. Though no other court of appeals
has addressed the same issue, the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 8th, and 11th circuits
have answered an analogous question by “citing the expressio unius
maxim” and holding that “the pertinent statutes do not authorize tolling a
term of supervised release during the period in which an offender is
absent by reason of his deportation.” Id. at 68. The 1st Circuit agreed
with this reasoning, noting that “when Congress explicitly allows for
tolling in a particular circumstance, there is a strong presumption that
Congress did not intend to allow tolling in other circumstances.” Id.
Therefore, the 1st Circuit disagreed with the 9th Circuit and held that
“the fact that Congress provided for tolling a period of supervised release
only when an offender is imprisoned for a different crime is a decisive
argument for the proposition that Congress did not intend to toll a period
of supervised release for any other reason (including an offender’s
fugitive status).” Id.

